Ali Nassiri Aghdam; Zeynab Mortazavifar
Abstract
To transform their innovative ideas to profitable businesses, entrepreneurs need to organize many different transactions. To perform theses transaction, they need to operate in the context of institutional environment. If institutional environment facilitates transactions and lowers their costs, it is ...
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To transform their innovative ideas to profitable businesses, entrepreneurs need to organize many different transactions. To perform theses transaction, they need to operate in the context of institutional environment. If institutional environment facilitates transactions and lowers their costs, it is said that there is a good business environment and we expect that the benefits of transactions outweigh their costs and in this environment, innovations relevant to transactions can be realized and vice versa. In this paper, following John R. Commons, one of the pioneers of original institutional economics, we argue that to lower transaction costs, institution must be able to resolves conflicts of interest. In other word, to design cost-economizing institutions, one needs to recognize conflicts of interest and find solutions in the way that they can be resolved. In this framework, we demonstrate that some of the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators are designed to indicate the existence and efficiency of such institutions. If it seems acceptable, then improving business environment would be a continuous process of designing institutions that their main function is resolving conflicts of interest.
Zahra Ziya’i; parisa mohajeri; Ali Nasiri Aghdam
Abstract
In real world, taxpayers have private information of which tax agencies are either completely or partly not aware of. This issue gives rise to the so-called asymmetric information problem, seriously preventing tax laws from being justly and efficiently enforced. Asymmetry of information motivates taxpayer ...
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In real world, taxpayers have private information of which tax agencies are either completely or partly not aware of. This issue gives rise to the so-called asymmetric information problem, seriously preventing tax laws from being justly and efficiently enforced. Asymmetry of information motivates taxpayer towards falsifying or concealing information, trying to enjoy benefits of failure to pay taxes (moral hazard); furthermore, by granting licenses to bad economic operators for operating as authorized economic operators, law-abiding companies may leave licensed and authorized market (adverse selection). It is obvious that, information sharing and availability of databases containing taxpayers’ information can help governments in recognizing and collecting taxes in a justly and fair manner. In this paper, using statistics from 92 countries during 2006 – 2012 (in the form of panel data), we have studied the effects of information sharing variables on tax-to-GDP ratio. The findings indicate that, information sharing has a positive, yet statistically insignificant, effect on the ratio, which is in agreement with theoretical foundations.
Ali Nasiri Aghdam; Ashraf Razmi
Volume 15, Issue 58 , October 2015, , Pages 61-82
Abstract
In this paper, to evaluate income and distributional effects of Personal Income Tax, a hypothetical society is simulated. 12 income sources are defined that each member of society can earn income from one income source or more. Then, using FORTRAN programming, the government's tax income, income distribution ...
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In this paper, to evaluate income and distributional effects of Personal Income Tax, a hypothetical society is simulated. 12 income sources are defined that each member of society can earn income from one income source or more. Then, using FORTRAN programming, the government's tax income, income distribution and average tax rate are calculated, assuming five alternative Scenarios: 0. Base scenario: taxing personal income at source according to "Direct Income Taxes Act"; 1. taxing the sum of incomes each individual person earns from different businesses he or she owns and exempt his / her business income once; 2. taxing the sum of incomes each person earns from non-exempt sources and exempt his / her business income once; 3. taxing the sum of incomes each person earns from exempt and non-exempt sources and exempt his / her business income once; 4. qualifying third scenario by accepting a 1 billion Rials as exemption. Results of simulation indicate that the government's income and income equality is maximized in 3rd scenario.
